About national and international power in the “modern” or Post Renaissance period. Explains how the various powers have risen and fallen over the 5 centuries since the formation of the “new monarchies” in W. Europe.
Customer Reviews
Military interest:
a seminal work and a must read for anyone in the military with an interest in world history and in events that caused the political, economic and military changes.
Flawed premises lead to wrong conclusions:
Kennedy’s book chronicles the decline of the British empire, and argues that the American empire is next. This is because, he says, both empires suffered or currently suffer from “imperial overstretch,” that unhappy state of affairs where military and defense obligations outweigh the benefits accrued from the subject territories. This is a seriously flawed premise which, at best, fits the British empire only loosely, and the United States not at all.
The British empire did spend heavily in the years leading up to WW I (which Kennedy argues led to its decline) but Britain actually spent less on defense, as a percentage of GDP, than the other great powers at the time.
The “overstretch” thesis is even less apposite in the context of the United States. First, the U.S. is not an “empire” as Kennedy defines it. Second, U.S. military obligations have not risen in proportion to its GDP to the height of the Vietnam War. Third, Kennedy fails to adequately explain a logical link between military expenditures and economic decline. He does attempt to explain the link in purely economic terms, i.e., the massive amounts spent to sustain a military force, but he does not explain how military spending, which declined relative to GDP, is somehow different than social welfare spending, which has taken an increasingly large share of GDP.
What appears to suffer most from “overstretch” is Kennedy’s thesis itself.
A great book about international economics and power:
A very well written and thought out book about how countries become powerful and what happens to affect their power
American Decline - War Spending:
An absolutely indispensible source book to understand the deline of America to a second rate ex empire. Well written, and loaded with facts of production and distributiion, this is a somewhat “heavy text”. Although America’s future is not discussed per se, you reach the unavoidable conclusion that our nation, like all failed states in the past, declines and falls when it wastes its production of wealth on war. So it has ever been.
Well argued thesis, although subject to question:
As Kennedy puts it in his “Introduction,” “This is a book about national and international power in the “modern”–that is, post-Renaissance–period. It seeks to trace and to explain how the various great powers have risen and fallen. . . .” And, on the same page:
“The `military conflict’ referred to in the book’s subtitle is therefore always examined in the context of `economic change.’ The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has also been the consequence of the more or less efficient utilization of the state’s productive resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the way in which that state’s economy has been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations. . . .”
He examines a variety of historical instances in which empires or countries spend more on their empires or expansion than they can afford. Too much expenditure on defense and the military drains the national treasure and wealth and can lead to an erosion in the vitality and power of that society.
Earlier examples of imperial overreach or overstretch include the Hapsburg Empire (1519-1659). From 1660-1815, other examples are adduced. So, too, periods such as 1815-1885, 1885-1918, 1919-1942.
He goes on to examine the bipolar world after World War II (the United States versus the Soviet Union) and the time there following. He is pessimistic about the United States maintaining its dominance. Two decades after the book was written, that fear has not come about. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did suffer from its “overreach” and has not survived as a major power in a bipolar system. Today’s Russia is simply not a superpower anymore. Thus, his fear for the American future has not yet come about. Will it? If he is right and the United States overreaches, then we would expect decline. If his view is correct, there is a challenge to American decision makers to make sure that this does not happen. Are they up to the task? As historians might note, we must wait until the future to know.
Thus, while some of his forecasts clearly have not yet come about, he does produce a rich historical analysis of the relationship between the internal characteristics of a society, the international context, and ultimate success or failure. This book is well worth grappling with. . . .
