WHY THE LINGUISTIC TURN IS SO POWERFUL
The discussion of political obligation is about the question why we have an obligation to obey the state, for example why we pay taxes and don’t see that as robbery. Many have tried to give a suitable answer, but none has succeeded. For example the consent theory says, in a simple way, that we have consented to the authority of the state and thereby have assumed our obligation to obey it. But easy as it is, we can just give a counter example in which have not consented and ascribe our obedience rather to gratitude to the state that has provided us with so much.
In fact all theories seem partially valid, but none is seen as adequate to describe all the relations in which we have an obligation to obey the state and, as philosophers tend to long for, that is what they should do in order to be seen as a valid theory. That is where the linguistic turn sticks its head around the corner and provides us with an argument that puts an end to our quest.
The question is if we are actually right to search for a theory that answers our matter in an absolute and universal way that is valid in every situation, always and everywhere. Does that kind of answer exist or is it rather a misunderstanding of what we are looking for that leads us in a endless and never satisfying undertaking. The question changes from “what gives us always an obligation to obey the state?” to “is there something that always gives us an obligation to obey the state?”
THE PRACTICE OF PROMISING
What political obligation is might become clear if we compare it to something that is more clear and something we normally not question to be true: the practice of promising, “are we obligated to keep our word?” The simple and right answer is obviously yes? Now the question is: why?
Promising is not just some word or phrase we express. Instead it is a practice that we have as humans. To make a promise is to take up an obligation. Further exploration is senseless. It is the mere meaning of promising, referring to a social practice we do as humans that demands of us to perform a certain task, because we are obligated to.
Off course, there are circumstances we can think of that will make us not to keep that promise, but that would not make the obligatory value of the promise disappear. That obligation remains, but simply is outweighed by other factors. We can put it in this way: if promising did not have the consequence of an obligation it would not be a promise, it is that social practice and convention that constitutes an obligation that makes it a promise. Thus, asking if a promise obliges is asking the same as if an obligation obliges.
THE OBLIGATORY ASPECT OF AUTHORITY
When we look at the meaning of a word like government we can see it as an institute we have a political obligation to, we need to obey it. Concepts like government, law, authority etc. all have this implicit meaning in it that it is ought to be obeyed. Just like a promise a government wouldn’t be a government if it wasn’t to be obeyed by its citizens. It is the mere meaning of the word government that implies this consequence. It is the way the word government is used. Therefore the phrase “the meaning is in the use” is so powerful.
To look beyond the meaning of words to find an absolute and universal meaning or derivation is an illusory assignment. The metaphysical assumption that is required to give meaning to that diligence has been blown away by great 20th century thinkers that successfully questioned such a ground. There is nothing more to be examined than the meaning of words and the social practices they resemble.
THE CONTINGENCY OF A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT
Now does that make our question why a specific institute can execute governmental power on a specific community without meaning. No. And the difference in this question by the adding of the word specific is exactly why, but is also why the question moves from a philosophical perspective to the perspective of sciences like political science and social studies. In those sciences we can look for characteristics and conditions that make a certain institute the legitimate government at a certain time and a certain place.
We can can even formulate opinions about this government being a good government or not, but that does not say anything about absolute and universal characteristics and conditions that make any institute a legitimate government. The meaning is in the use and the use is a contingent fact.
